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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARDEN R. KOHLER and JOY J.
KOHLER,

JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF
PERMANENT INJUNCTION

Plaintiffs,
vs.
STEPHEN C. MARTIN,

Civil No: 7122

Defendant.

Judge: Guy R. Burningham

This matter came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Guy R. Burningham, Judge
of the above entitled court sitting without a jury on the 12th, 13th and 14th of October, 1994.
The Court, having heard all the evidence and arguments of counsel and being fully advised in
the premises, and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS NOW THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs are granted judgment that the roadway on the west and adjacent to

Plaintiffs' real property is a public thoroughfare extending northward from the intersection of
Second North Street and Second West Street of Midway City, Utah to a line extended westerly
along the north side of the asphalt driveway where it enters Plaintiffs' real property. That
portion of the public thoroughfare which lies upon the land of the Defendant and to which
Defendants' land is subject is described as follows:
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Beginning at a point North 5.68 chains and West 17.23 chains from the Southeast
corner of the Northeast Quarter of Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 4 East,
Salt Lake Base & Meridian (recorded as the point of beginning for property
owned by Stephen C. Martin as recorded in Entry #144387, Book 196, Page 324
of Wasatch County Records);
Thence N 89°12'00" W a distance of 56.10 feet to
Paul Wilson property line; thence North along said
property line a distance of 277 feet more or less to
a point at the intersection of a line extended
westerly along the North side of an Asphalt
driveway entering the Marden Kohler property;
thence West along said extended line a distance of
56.09 feet to the West property line of Marden
Kohler; thence South partially along Kohler
property boundary a distance of 277 feet more or
less to the point of beginning;
2.

Plaintiffs are granted judgment that they are the owners of the right to the free

and unobstructed permanent use of the said public thoroughfare for access and egress and
vehicular travel and parking in connection with the use of Plaintiffs' residence and real property
which is more particularly described as follows:
Beginning 660 feet North and 15.25 chains West of the Southeast corner of the
Northeast quarter of Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake
Meridian; and running thence West 132 feet; thence South 137 feet; thence East
132 feet; thence North 137 feet to the point of beginning.
3.

Plaintiffs rights to the use of said public thoroughfare are rights that are

appurtenant to and run with their land and may be conveyed to their successors in interest.
4.

Plaintiffs are granted judgment that they are the owners of a private easement and

right of way acquired both by a grant of easement and by prescriptive easement over and upon
the said roadway and thoroughfare and specifically that portion of Defendant's land described
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in Paragraph 1 above. Said easement and right of way is for the unobstructed and permanent
use for access and egress and vehicular travel and parking in connection with Plaintiffs' real
property described in Paragraph 2 above. Plaintiffs' right to said easement is hereby quieted in
them and is a permanent right that is appurtenant to and runs with their land and can be
conveyed to their successors in interest.
5.

The Defendant is hereby ordered to forthwith remove the metal gate and gateposts

he caused to be installed upon the roadway and thoroughfare that is the subject of this action and
is hereby permanently enjoined from in any way obstructing the free and open travel by persons
and vehicles upon any portions of the roadway from Second North Street northward to the north
line of the land described in Paragraph 1 above. Defendant is further permanently enjoined from
interfering with, harassing or otherwise causing problems in any with the use by Plaintiffs, their
successors and assigns and their tenants, guests, friends, relatives, visitors, invitees and others
from the free and open use of the roadway and thoroughfare for access, egress and parking of
vehicles in connection with the use of Plaintiffs' property.
6.

The Plaintiffs are hereby restrained from harassing, belittling or causing problems

with Defendant's use of the roadway and his land so long as that use does not interfere with
their rights. Plaintiffs are further ordered to strive to exercise what influence they can to
prevent any such actions by their tenants and family members.
7.

It is ordered in relation to the care, maintenance and repairs of the improvements

in the roadway and thoroughfare for the area described in Paragraph 1 above the parties shall
3

4

continue the practice of sharing in such work, such that Plaintiff will do the care, mowing
watering and maintenance on the east side of the asphalt surfacing and Defendant shall do it on
the west side. As to repair or maintenance of the asphalt surfacing, when Defendant determines
there is such a need, he shall set a reasonable time frame and obtain a bid for the work and
submit it to Plaintiffs for their approval a reasonable time before the proposed work is to begin.
If Plaintiffs do not approve of the bid or timing for the work or if Defendant fails to obtain a
bid for work Plaintiffs deem is necessary, Plaintiffs shall obtain a bid and submit it to
Defendant. The work shall be let to the lowest responsible bidder and the parties shall share
equally in the cost.
8.

Plaintiffs are granted their costs in this action.

9.

The Court reserves for later determination in this action the issues raised by the

Order to Show Cause for Contempt of Court heretofore entered in this action as well as the
question of the award of attorney fees in connection therewith.
DATED and signed this ^j

Approved as to form:
Robert Felton

day of^DvcmM^ 190^
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MARDEN R. KOHLER and JOY J.
KOHLER,

•AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs.
STEPHEN C. MARTIN,

GvilNo:7122

Defendant.

Judge: Guy R. Burningham

This matter came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Guy R. Burningham, Judge
in the above entitled court sitting without a jury on the 12th, 13th and 14th of October, 1994.
The Court, having heard all the evidence and arguments of counsel and being fully advised in
the premises, now makes and enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs are the owners of a residence and real property in Midway City,

Wasatch County, State of Utah, more particularly described as follows:
Beginning 660 feet North and 15.25 chains West of the Southeast corner of the
Northeast quarter of Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake
Meridian; and running thence West 132 feet; thence South 137 feet; thence East
132 feet; thence North 137 feet to the point of beginning.
2.

The Defendant is a resident of Midway City, Wasatch County, State of Utah, and

the owner of a residence and real property therein, more particularly described as follows:
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Beginning at a point North 5.68 chains and West 17.25 chains from the Southeast
corner of the Northeast quarter of Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 4 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89 degrees 12 minutes West 56.1
feet; thence North 648.6 feet to the South line of the Eugene Probst property;
thence Easterly 319.44 feet to a point 362.34 feet North of the Northeast corner
of Harold Fabian's property; thence South 362.34 feet; thence North 89 degrees
12 minutes West 132.1 feet, thence South 11.5 feet; thence West 132 feet; thence
South to the point of beginning.
3.

The real property of the Plaintiffs and that of the Defendant are adjacent to each

other and abut along the West and North boundaries of the Plaintiffs' land. Defendant's deed
includes title to a substantial portion of a roadway lying to the West and extending Southward
from the Plaintiffs' land which connects with Second North Street.

The relationship of

Plaintiffs' and Defendant's properties and the roadway are illustrated by Plaintiffs' Exhibit
15(A), a copy of which is attached hereto marked "Exhibit A" and made a part hereof by
reference.
4.

The Court finds from clear and convincing evidence that the roadway adjacent to

Plaintiffs' real property and extending northward from the intersection of Second North Street
and Second West Street of Midway City to a line extended westerly from the north side of
Plaintiffs' asphalt driveway where it enters the Plaintiffs' property was historically and
continuously used by the general public as a public thoroughfare for far in excess of a 10 year
period of time. The width of the thoroughfare area extended from fences along its west side and
east side which are still in their historic locations. The entire thoroughfare area was used by the
general public both for passage of people and animals and for the travel and parking of vehicles.
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The use of the thoroughfare by the public was not only in connection with the use of the land
now owned by the Plaintiffs, but also for access by the public to the lands north of the properties
of these parties. The thoroughfare area was always open for the free and unobstructed passage
of people and vehicles from its south end northward past the Plaintiffs' land from before 1922
to at least 1948. The said thoroughfare area is now used and claimed by Plaintiffs for access
to and the use of their property.
5.

The public thoroughfare which lies upon the land of Defendant is described as

follows:
Beginning at a point North 5.68 chains and West 17.23 chains from the Southeast
corner of the Northeast Quarter of Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 4 East,
Salt Lake Base & Meridian (recorded as the point of beginning for property
owned by Stephen C. Martin as recorded in Entry #144387, Book 196, Page 324
of Wasatch County Records);
Thence N 89°12'00" W a distance of 56.10 feet to Paul Wilson
property line; thence North along said property line a distance of
277 feet more or less to a point at the intersection of a line
extended westerly along the North side of an Asphalt driveway
entering the Marden Kohler property; thence West along said
extended line a distance of 56.09 feet to the West property line of
Marden Kohler; thence South partially along Kohler property
boundary a distance of 277 feet more or less to the point of
beginning.
6.

The roadway thoroughfare established by public usage has never been abandoned

or vacated by order of any highway authorities having jurisdiction over the roadway, or by other
competent authority.
7.

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Plaintiffs predecessors

in title, the Buhler family, operated a commercial swimming facility with two pools and a store
3
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upon the land now owned and occupied by the Plaintiffs' residence. The Buhler's facilities were
known as the Buhler's Hot Pots, and although they never owned the land upon which the
roadway is located, the roadway was used for many years, far in excess of 10 years, by the
general public as a thoroughfare for access and egress and parking of vehicles going to the
Buhler facilities and also for access to the land north of those facilities which was a popular
geologic and thermal spring area known as the "Mound". The entire roadway was used for such
purposes and is the same roadway as is now used by the Plaintiffs for access to their property.
The roadway has been regularly used by Plaintiffs' and their parents, Reed and Elda Kohler for
access to their property since the summer of 1966. The roadway was always open without
obstruction to the free passage of the public and vehicles.
8.

The Court finds by a preponderance of evidence that in the summer of 1966, prior

to purchasing the land where they built their home, Plaintiffs' parents, Reed and Elda Kohler
approached William Ferrin Whitaker and Martha B. Whitaker (who were then the owners of the
land now owned by Defendant) and sought their permission to use the roadway for access to
what is now Plaintiffs land if they were to buy it and build their home there. That land
formerly occupied by Buhler's Hot Pots, would otherwise have been landlocked. The Whitakers
were aware of all the material facts and agreed and gave their permission intending it to be
permanent and without restriction or limitation. Reed and Elda Kohler then bought the land in
August 1966 and immediately thereafter built their home on it in reasonable reliance upon the
permission and easement that had been granted by the Whitakers.

The Kohlers had the

continuous, regular and uninterrupted use of the roadway from the summer of 1966 until July
29, 1992, when Defendant put a padlock on a gate he had recently installed near the South end
of the roadway. Until Defendant locked the gate there had been no effort by Defendant or any
of his predecessors in title to withdraw permission for use of the roadway. Defendant's action
in installing and locking the gate, caused significant detriment to Plaintiffs and if allowed to
resume or continue, would cause Plaintiffs and their tenants irreparable harm, including harm
4
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to health and safety and this court entered a preliminary injunction in this action on September
21, 1992 requiring Defendant to unlock the gate and cease interfering with Plaintiffs' and their
tenants use of the roadway.
9.

The Whitakers had asphalted and improved the road before granting Kohlers

permission to use it. After the Kohlers had built and were occupying their home, the Whitakers
first communicated to Reed Kohler a demand that he pay the Whitakers for a percentage of the
value of the land in the roadway, a percentage of the cost of the improvements the Whitakers
had installed, and to share in the future maintenance. Elda Kohler was not a party to that
conversation and never agreed to make the payment demanded. Reed Kohler never made
payment and died on June 9, 1969. The Whitakers thereafter continued to repeatedly make
demands upon Elda Kohler for payment for the land and improvements, thereby manifesting that
her continued use of the roadway was adverse to their interests.
10.

In April of 1972 the Whitakers presented to Elda Kohler a formal written proposal

for an agreement for payment for and use of the roadway. Elda Kohler never agreed to the
proposal but continued the regular use of the roadway. The Whitakers never interrupted or
objected to her use of the roadway although they continued to demand payment during the entire
time they owned the land now owned by Defendant. Elda Kohler's use of the roadway was
open, notorious, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted from April of 1972. The Whitakers
failure to pursue their claim for payment effectively waived any rights they may have had to
collect payment for the land and improvements.
11.

On December 9, 1980, the Whitakers deeded their land to their brother and sister-

in-law Richard Fred Bassett and Karen E. Bassett, who had knowledge of the use of the roadway
and easement by the Kohlers. The lay of the land, the asphalt surfacing and improvements made
it apparent that the roadway was the means of access to the Kohler residence and had been used
over a long number of years. The location of the Kohlers attached garage facing onto the
roadway and the asphalt driveways extending from the asphalt of the roadway to the Kohler
5
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garage contributed to make the Kohler use open, visible, notorious and adverse. Their use was
regular, continuous, unobstructed and uninterrupted during the ownership of the land by
Bassetts. The Bassetts never gave permission for the use of the roadway by Elda Kohler or the
Plaintiffs which use was clearly adverse as to the Bassetts.
12.

On April 10, 1980, Elda Kohler deeded her land and residence to the Plaintiffs

although she continued to live in the home and use the roadway until 1992. Elda Kohler and
Plaintiffs continued to have the uninterrupted and unobstructed regular and continuous use of the
roadway thereafter.
13.

At the end of 1987, the Bassetts deeded the land and roadway to the Defendant,

Stephen C. Martin, who likewise had knowledge of the use of the roadway and easement by the
Kohlers. The circumstances were unchanged from what they were during the ownership by the
Bassetts. Defendant never gave permission for use by the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs use of the
roadway continued regularly, continuously and uninterrupted and unobstructed and was also
open, visible, notorious and adverse to the Defendant until he locked the gate on July 29, 1992.
14.

Plaintiffs and their parents had the open and unrestricted use of the roadway

adversely to Defendant and his predecessors in title for over 20 years (from April 1972 when
Whitakers first demanded payment for the land and improvements until July 29, 1992 when
Defendant locked the metal gate he installed near the south end of the roadway). Defendant
installed the gate in April 1992, but the Kohlers and their tenants continued unrestricted use of
the roadway until Defendant locked it with a padlock on July 29, 1992.
15.

The Court finds that Defendant has harassed the Plaintiffs and their tenants and

invitees in the use of the roadway and thoroughfare, that his actions in installing and locking the
metal gate causing the necessity for the Preliminary Injunction to be entered in this action was
in violation of Plaintiffs rights and give rise to the necessity that this Court enter its order and
a permanent injunction requiring that Defendant forthwith remove the gate and its metal posts,
from in any way obstructing the free and open usage by persons and vehicles of the roadway as
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described herein and from interfering in any way with the use by Plaintiffs, their successors and
assigns and their tenants, guests, friends, relatives, visitors, invitees and others from the free
and open use of the roadway for access, egress and parking in connection with the use of
Plaintiffs' property and this Court should enter its order to restore them to their free and open
usage of the roadway and thoroughfare. Defendant should likewise be restrained from harassing
in any way or causing problems for Plaintiffs and such other persons in the use of the roadway
and thoroughfare.
16.

There have been feelings generated between the parties such that the Plaintiffs

should also be restrained from harassing, belittling or causing problems with the Defendants' use
of his land so long as his use does not interfere with their rights and Plaintiffs should exercise
their influence to prevent any such actions by their tenants and family members.
17.

The parties have in the past shared in the care and maintenance of the portion of

the roadway from its north boundary described in paragraph 5 of these findings down to the
north boundary of Second North Street of Midway City. The Plaintiffs and their predecessors
have in the past done the care by way of mowing and watering on the east side of the asphalt
surfacing and the Defendant has done it on the West side. There is a need .that the parties
should continue to share in the care and maintenance in that way. As to any need for
maintenance or repair of the asphalt surfacing, when Defendant determines there is such a need,
he should be ordered to determine a time frame for the work and obtain a bid and submit it to
Plaintiffs for approval a reasonable time before the proposed work is to begin. If Plaintiffs do
not approve of the bid or if Defendant fails to obtain a bid for work Plaintiffs deem necessary,
Plaintiffs shall obtain a bid and submit it to Defendant. The work shall be let to the lowest
responsible bidder and the parties shall share equally in the cost.
18.

The Court does not find that Defendant's defense of this action was without merit

and entered in bad faith as to the substance of the case, however, the Court should reserve for
later determination the issues raised in the Order to Show Cause for Contempt of Court
7
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heretofore entered in this action as well as the question of the award of attorney fees in
connection therewith.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The roadway which is the subject of this action and that portion of Defendant's

land as described in paragraph 5 of the Court's Findings of Fact in this action became and still
is a public thoroughfare under the provisions of Section 27-12-89, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended; and as such the Plaintiffs, and their successors in interest in their land are entitled
to the free and unobstructed permanent use of the roadway for access and egress and vehicular
travel and parking in connection with the use of Plaintiffs' residence and real property which
land is more particularly described in Paragraph 1 of the Findings of Fact.
2.

Plaintiffs are the owners of an easement and right of way over and upon the

roadway described in paragraph 5 of the Court's Findings of Fact. William Ferrin Whitaker and
Martha B. Whitaker, the then owners of the fee title to the roadway granted the easement, by
oral agreement which was acted and relied upon by Reed and Elda Kohler and established a
permanent and unrestricted easement for use of the roadway. The Kohlers reliance upon that
grant of easement by their use of the roadway and constructing their substantial home made that
grant of easement irrevocable. They and the Plaintiffs have continued to use the roadway for
over 27 years in reliance upon that grant of easement. The Kohler land is the dominant estate
and the Defendant's land the servient estate in relation to that easement. Plaintiffs and their
successors have the right to that permanent easement which is a right which runs with their land
for the continued permanent use of the easement and roadway.
3.

The Court also concludes as a matter of law that the doctrines of promissory

estoppel and equity apply to the facts of this case to prevent Defendant from withdrawal of the
promise and agreement of his predecessors, the Whitakers, granting the Kohlers the permanent
use of the roadway by reason of the following elements:
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a.

The promise and agreement was reasonable expected to induce reliance by

the Kohlers.
b.

The Kohlers reasonably relied upon and took action in reliance upon the

promise and agreement by buying their land, building their home and using the roadway.
c.

There would be significant and substantial detriment to the Plaintiffs for

the Defendant to be allowed to withdraw the permission and agreement.
d.
4.

The promissors, the Whitakers, were aware of all material facts.

The Court further finds as a matter of law that Plaintiffs have established that they

also own a prescriptive easement for the permanent and unrestricted use of that portion of the
roadway upon Defendant's land as described in Paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact for the
continued use for access and egress and vehicular travel and parking in connection with the use
of their residence and real property which perscriptive easement is a right which runs with the
land.
5.

The Court should enter its permanent restraining order and order for the care and

maintenance for the roadway and thoroughfare as set forth in paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 of the
Findings of Fact.
DATED and signed this /^-day of April, 1995.

Approved as to form:

Robert Felton

•

1 4

-^..XT*,,

EXHIBIT A
WEST 319.44ft

4$

4>

^

h

o
SOUTH
L1.50ft

CO

%

N89'12'00"W

132.10ft

WEST 132.00 ft

3
N89'12'00"Yf
56.10 ft

ROAD RO.W

J
GATE
200 NORTH

o
o

ROAD RO.W.

15

h

u?'

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT

ssssr£

A. Dean Jeffs, No. 1653
JEFFS AND JEFFS
Attorneys at Law
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
90 North 100 East
P. O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848

JDatQ

Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARDEN R. KOHLER AND
JOY J. KOHLER,

:
:

Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS, ORDER FOR SECURITY
FOR COSTS BY NON-RESIDENT
PLAINTIFF AND FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

vs.

STEPHEN C. MARTIN,
:
Defendant.

Civil No. 7122
Judge Cullen Y. Christensen

The above-entitled matter came on for a regularly scheduled hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion
For Preliminary Injunction en the 4th day of September, 1992. before the Honorable Lynn W
Davis, Fourth Judicial District Court Judge. The Plaintiff, Marden R. Kohler was present and
represented by his counsel, A. Dean Jeffs of the firm of Jeffs and Jeffs. The Defendant,
Stephen C. Marten was present and represented by his counsel, Barney R. Saunders of the firm
of Saunders & Saunders. Witnesses were sworn and testified and photographs and documentary
evidence was introduced.
The Court having heard the evidence presented in support of the preliminary injunction
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and having heard the evidence presented by Defendant herein and the Court being fully advised
in the premises, now makes and enters the following:
1.

The Plaintiffs have shown that they and the tenants of their residence located at

226 North 2nd West, Midway, Utah, will suffer irreparable harm if Defendant continues to lock
the gate to the roadway which is the subject of this action, including harm to health and safety
unless this Court issues an injunction enjoining Defendant and anyone acting on his behalf from
locking the said gate and from interfering with the use of said roadway by Plaintiffs and their
tenants for access to the residence of the Plaintiffs and which Plaintiffs and their predecessors
in title have used for access to the residence for in excess of 20 years.
2.

The threatened injury to the Plaintiffs outweighs whatever damage the injunction

may cause the Defendant. No evidence of any damages Defendant might sustain by reason of
the injunction was presented.
3.

The injunction would not be adverse to the public interest but would be in the

public interest by reason of health and safety.
4.

This case presents serious issues on the merits which should be the subject of

further litigation in this action.
ORDER
The Court orders the Plaintiffs to furnish an undertaking in the amount of $300.00 as
security for costs of non-resident Plaintiff and dispenses with the requirement of further security
as Defendant did not introduce evidence in support thereof.
2
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PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Defendant is ordered to remove the lock from the gate and the parked vehicles from the
roadway which is the subject of this action.
During the pendency of this action, or until further order of the Court, Defendant is
enjoined from locking the gate on the roadway which is the subject of this action and from
parking vehicles in the traveled portions of said roadway and from otherwise interfering with
the use by Plaintiffs and their tenants of the said roadway in any area south of an imaginary line
extending west from the northernmost hard road surfacing of the driveway that provides access
to the north bay of Plaintiffs' garage southward to Second North Street, Midway, Utah.
DATED and signed this ^ / day of September, 1992.
BY THE COURT:
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Delete first "Whereas". The kohlers did not buy their property from
us but have to use our lane for access to their property.

Add a last paragraph to the effect that both parties will share equally
from this date forward in the cost of upkeep and maintenance of the
lane and that this will be binding on any future owner.
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A G R E E M E N T

This Agreement made and entered into this _
of April, 1972, by and between W.

T^ERRIN

day

WHITAKER and MARTHA

B. WHITAKER, his wife here and after called the ^irst Party
and Elda Kohler, here and after called the Second Party, all
of Midway, Utah:
W I T N E S S E T H

•

WHEREAS, the First *arty did sell to the Second
Party and her husband a building site adjacent to the home of
the First party, and
WHEREAS, a private lane is used to reach the residence
of both Parties, and
WHEREAS, the private lane to the residence of both
Parties is the property of the First Party, and
WHEREAS, the first narty has soent considerable money
fixing, repairing and maintaining said lane, and
WHEREAS, one-half of the total cost of said lane is
Nine Hundred Thirty Three and 44/100 ($933.44) Dollars.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and
mutual agreements between the parties it is respectfully aareed
as follows:
1.

That the First Party hereby arants to the Second

Party the unrestricted right to use said lane as a road to and
from her residence.
2.

The Second Party agrees that if she should sell

the home to a third party or in the event of her death that the
third party or the Second Party's estate shall pay to the
First Party one-half the cost of fixing, repairing and majntainino
said lane which is the sum of Nine Hundred Thirty Three and 44/100
($933.44) Dollars.
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3.

Tt is further agreed between the parties that

so long as the Second Party uses her home as her residence
and lives there that she is to pay nothing for the use of said
lane but is to have complete free use of the road for her private
use and the use of those who would visit her premises.

FIRST PARTY

'SECOND PARTY
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A G R E F M E N T

This Agreement made and entered into this

day

of April, 1972, by and between W. FERRIN WHITAKER and MARTHA
B. WHITAKER, his wife here and after called the First Party
and Elda Kohler, here and after called the Second Party, all
of Midway, Utah:
W I T N E S S E T H

:

^WHEREAS, the First Party did sell to the Second
Party and her husband a building site adjacent to the home of
the First Party, and
WHEREAS, a private lane is used to reach the residence
of both Parties, and
WHEREAS, the private lane to the residence of both
Parties is the property of the First Party, and
WHEREAS, the first party has spent considerable money
fixing, repairing and maintaining said lane, and
WHEREAS, one-half of the total cost of said lane is
Nine Hundred Thirty Three and 44/100 ($933.44) Dollars.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and
mutual agreements between the parties it is respectfully agreed
as follows:
1.

That the First Party hereby grants to the Second

Party the unrestricted right to use said lane as a road to and
from her residence.
2.

The Second Party agrees that if she should sell

the home to a third party or in the event of her death that the
third party or the Second Party's estate shall pay to the
First Party one-half the cost of fixing, repairing and maintaining
said lane which is the sum of Nine Hundred Thirty Three and 44/100
($933.44) Dollars.

J HAROLD CALL
A T T O R N E Y AT
2 3 WEST C E N T E R
HEBER CITY

LAW
STREET

U T A H 64032
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3.

It is further agreed between the parties that

so long as the Second Party uses her home as her residence
and lives there that she is to pay nothing for the use of said
lane but is to have complete free use of the road for her private
use and the use of those who would visit her premises.

FIRST PARTY

SECOND PARTY

J HAROLD CALL
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2 3 WEST CENTER STREET
HEBER CITY. UTAH 84032

!6

Oct. lf 1985

Because it is to the mutual advantage of myself and the owner
of the home to the north of me to enhance the value of our
properties by keeping the private entry lane green and attractive I hereby agree as my share of the use by myself, family,
friends and heirs of the said lane to water at my expense the
lawn on the entire east side of the lane from the street to the
north side of the driveway of my home which is adjacent to the
above lane in Midway, Utah.

The lane is presently owned by

W. F. Whitaker and is a continuation to the north of Second West
beyond Second North in Midway.
(JLS C^ty

^i''
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This agreement will be binding on my heirs.
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ARTICLE 6
ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY FOR HIGHWAY
PURPOSES
27-12-89. Public use constituting dedication.
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use
of the public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for
a period of ten years.
319

27-12-90. Highways once established continue until abandoned.
All public highways once established shall continue to be highways until
abandoned or vacated by order of the highway authorities having jurisdiction
over any such highway, or by other competent authority
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 90.
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY AND MAILING
I hereby certify that the original and seven (7) copies of
Addendum of Appellees were hand-delivered to the Clerk of the
Court, in the Utah Court of Appeals, and two (2) copies were sent
to the below named party by placing the same in the United States
mail, postage prepaid, this 16th day of November, 1995, addressed
as follows:
Robert Felton, Esq.
Attorney at Law
39 Exchange Place, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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